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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20061109-CA

v.
JACOB A. WEBB,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction on one count of
burglary, a third degree felony (R. 105-06).

This Court has

jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2) (e) (West 2004) .
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Did the trial court correctly sentence defendant for felony
burglary rather than misdemeanor burglary of a vehicle where
defendant admitted to breaking into and stealing multiple items
from two camping trailers, which the trial court properly
categorized as "buildings" within the meaning of the burglary
statute?
A sentence will not be overturned on appeal unless the trial
court has abused its discretion, failed to consider all legally

relevant factors, or imposed a sentence that exceeds legally
prescribed limits.

State v. Gibbons, 779 P.2d 1133, 1135 (Utah

1989)(citations omitted).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (West 2004), governing burglary,
provides:
(1) An actor is guilty of burglary if he
enters or remains unlawfully in a building or
any portion of a building with intent to
commit:
(b) theft[.]
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree
unless it was committed in a dwelling, in
which event it is a felony of the second
degree.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-201 (West 2004), governing definitions
applicable to burglary and criminal trespass, provides:
For purposes of this part:
(1) "Building," in addition to its ordinary
meaning, means any watercraft, aircraft,
trailer, sleeping car, or other structure or
vehicle adapted for overnight accommodation
of persons or for carrying on business
therein
. . . .
(2) "Dwelling" means a building which is
usually occupied by a person lodging therein
at night, whether or not a person is actually
present. . . .
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-204

(West 2004), governing burglary of

a vehicle, provides:
(1) Any person who unlawfully enters any
vehicle with intent to commit a felony or
theft is guilty of burglary of a vehicle.
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(2) Burglary of a vehicle is a class A
misdemeanor.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with one count each of burglary, a
third degree felony, and theft, a class A misdemeanor (R. 1 ) .
After a preliminary hearing, defendant filed a motion to quash
the bindover, which the trial court denied (R. 31-30, 137: 5 ) .
Thereafter, defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to one
count of burglary and the court dismissed the theft charge. (R.
87-96).

The court sentenced defendant to a suspended zero-to-

five-year prison term, 180 days in jail with credit for time
served, a fine of $800, restitution of $1065, and a panoply of
probation conditions (R. 105-06, R. 140: 5-6).

Defendant filed a

timely appeal (R. 115).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Defendant admitted to breaking into two camping trailers
parked in Pole Canyon in October 2005 and taking a variety of
items from the trailers, including a distinctive hooded
sweatshirt, a hunting vest, a deer print blanket, camp chairs, a
gun cleaning kit, and nine boxes of ammunition (R. 52-54).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant contends that where he admitted to breaking into
and stealing property from two camping trailers, the State could
have charged him with either felony burglary or misdemeanor
burglary of a vehicle.

Defendant bases this argument on the

premise that a camping trailer is a vehicle as a matter of law.
3

Relying on State v. Shondel, he concludes that, because he could
have been charged with either offense, the trial court erred by
sentencing him for the greater of the two crimes.
Defendant's argument fails for two reasons.

First, the

definition he cites for "camping trailer" comes from a section of
the Code governing automobile franchises, wholly irrelevant here.
The relevant definition appears in the part of the Code governing
burglary and criminal trespass.
defines a "trailer . . .

The applicable statute clearly

or other structure or vehicle adapted

for overnight accommodations of persons" as a "building."
Code Ann. § 76-6-201(1).

Utah

Defense counsel conceded the camping

trailer "was equipped with a sleeping area" (R. 137: 3 ) . The
trailer, therefore, is plainly a "building" within the meaning of
the burglary statute.
Second, the Shondel doctrine does not apply because burglary
and vehicle burglary do not describe the same crime.

An

additional element—adaptation for overnight accommodationdistinguishes felony burglary from misdemeanor burglary of a
vehicle.

Thus, for burglary, the State had to prove the

additional element that the crime occurred in a "trailer. . . or
other structure or vehicle adapted for overnight accommodation of
persons."

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-201(1).

requirement for vehicle burglary.

There is no such

Because the statutory elements

of the two crimes are not "wholly duplicative," the Shondel
doctrine is inapplicable.
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ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY SENTENCED
DEFENDANT FOR FELONY BURGLARY
RATHER THAN MISDEMEANOR BURGLARY OF
A VEHICLE WHERE DEFENDANT ADMITTED
TO BREAKING INTO AND STEALING
MULTIPLE ITEMS FROM TWO CAMPING
TRAILERS, WHICH THE COURT PROPERLY
CATEGORIZED AS "BUILDINGS" FOR
PURPOSES OF THE BURGLARY STATUTE
Defendant admitted to stealing property from two camping
trailers (R. 87-96).

Because a camping trailer is a "vehicle" as

a matter of law, he argues that the State could have charged him
with either felony burglary or misdemeanor burglary of a vehicle.
Thus, despite his conviction for felony burglary, defendant
contends that he is entitled to the punishment applicable to
misdemeanor burglary of a vehicle.
11-12.

See Br. of Aplt. at 6-8, 9,

For this argument, he relies on State v. Shondel, 453

P.2d 146 (Utah 1969).
Defendant's argument fails for two related reasons. First,
he premises it on the incorrect notion that a camping trailer is
a "vehicle" as a matter of law.

To support this argument,

defendant extracts definitions from Title 13 (Commerce and
Trade), chapter 14 (New Automobile Franchise Act), a part of the
Utah Code governing the relationship between the State,
franchised car dealerships, and the public.

See Utah Code Ann. §

13-14-101 (West 2004)(outlining legislative purpose of Act); Br.
of Aplt. at 6-7.

Notably, the limiting phrase, "[a]s used in

this chapter" precedes the definitional section on which
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defendant relies.

See Utah Code Ann. § 13-14-102 (West 2004).

The definitions cited by defendant thus expressly relate only to
automobile franchises, which are plainly not at issue here.
The statute governing burglary provides that "[a]n actor is
guilty of burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in a
building or any portion of a building with intent to commit . . .
theft."

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (West 2004).

The definitions

applicable to the burglary statute provide that a "building," "in
addition to its ordinary meaning, means any . . . trailer,
sleeping car, or other structure or vehicle adapted for overnight
accommodation of persons . . . ."

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-201

(West 2004) .
The trial court looked to these statutorily-relevant
definitions, not to the New Automobile Franchise Act, when it
denied defendant's motion to quash the bindover because the State
had charged felony burglary rather than misdemeanor burglary of a
vehicle.

That is, the trial court correctly recognized that for

purposes of burglary and burglary of a vehicle, a camping trailer
is clearly categorized as a "building" and so falls squarely
within the burglary statute.
Specifically, the trial court ruled that "the trailer would
comply with a habitable dwelling, so it would qualify under the
burglary statute" (R. 137: 5 ) . In essence, the court recognized
that the Code section governing both burglary and vehicle
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burglary categorizes a camping trailer as, generally, a
"building" and, more specifically, a "dwelling."
A camping trailer is categorized as a "building" because,
"in addition to its ordinary meaning," a building includes "any
trailer . . .

or other structure or vehicle adapted for overnight

accommodations of persons."1

Utah Code Ann. §76-6-201 (1). A

camping trailer may more specifically be categorized as a
"dwelling," because it is a particular kind of "building," one
that is "usually occupied by a person lodging therein at night,
whether or not a person is actually present."

Xd at (2).2

The law is well settled that "[t]he plain language of a
statute is to be read as a whole, and its provisions interpreted
in harmony with other provisions in the same statute and Vith
other statutes under the same and related chapters.'" Lyons v.
Burton, 2000 UT 55, 1 17, 5 P. 3d 616 (quoting Roberts v.
Erickson, 851 P.2d 643, 644 (Utah 1993) (citation omitted));
accord State v. Holm, 2006 UT 31, 1 22, 137 P.3d 726.

Where the

trial court categorized a camping trailer correctly as a
building, it did not err in concluding that the State had
properly charged defendant with burglary, rather than burglary of

1

Defendant conceded that the camping trailer "was equipped
with a sleeping area" (R. 89, 137: 3 ) .
2

Burglary of a building is a third degree felony, while
burglary of a dwelling is a second degree felony. See Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6-201(1). Despite the court's reference to a dwelling,
defendant was convicted only of the lesser offense, burglary of a
building.
7

a vehicle and, consequently, in denying defendant's motion to
quash the bindover.
Second, defendant's argument also fails because when a
camping trailer is correctly categorized as a building within the
meaning of the burglary statute, the Shondel doctrine does not
apply.

Under Shondel and its progeny, if two statutes proscribe

precisely the same conduct but assess different penalties, the
defendant is entitled to receive the lesser penalty and
conviction.

Shondel, 453 P.2d at 147-48; State v. Gomez, 722

P.2d 747, 749 (Utah 1986); see also. State v. Bryan, 709 P.2d
257, 263 (Utah 1985); State v. Kent, 945 P.2d 145, 147 (Utah App.
1997); State v. Vogt, 824 P.2d 455, 457 (Utah App. 1991); State
v. Duran, 772 P.2d 982, 987 (Utah App. 1989).
The test for determining whether two statutes proscribe the
same conduct is whether the "two statutes are wholly duplicative
as to the elements of the crime."

Bryan, 709 P.2d at 263; see

also Kent, 945 P.2d at 147; Gomez, 722 P.2d at 749; Duran, 772
P.2d at 987.

If they are not, defendant may be sentenced for the

crime carrying the greater penalty, "even if the defendant
have

been

could

charged with the crime carrying the less severe

sentence, so long as there is a rational basis for the
legislative classification."

Kent, 945 P.2d at 147 (citations

omitted).
Here, the statutory requirements for burglary of a vehicle
are not "wholly duplicative" of the elements of burglary.
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Vehicle burglary requires a person to unlawfully enter a vehicle
with intent to commit a felony or theft only.
76-6-204.

Utah Code Ann. §

Burglary requires a person to enter or remain

unlawfully in a building with intent to commit a felony or theft
or to commit certain other specified crimes.
76-6-202.

Utah Code Ann. §

Without question, the State had to prove something

different than the elements of vehicle burglary in order to
establish that defendant committed burglary.

That is, the State

had to prove that the crime occurred in a ''trailer . . . or other
vehicle adapted for overnight accommodation."
76-6-201(1).

Utah Code Ann. §

The locus of the crime thus distinguishes felony

burglary from misdemeanor vehicle burglary.
Moreover, a rational basis exists for the differing
classifications of the two crimes.

The law has always accorded

the greatest privacy rights to one's home.

Historically, a

lesser expectation of privacy and autonomy has been accorded
one's vehicle.

A greater penalty for a home invasion and a

lesser penalty for invasion of one's vehicle thus rationally
relates to society's interest in according people a greater
degree of protection in places where they stay overnight.
Certainly, when a vehicle serves as a home, even if only
temporarily, by accommodating overnight stays, then it makes good
sense that the legislature would extend to such a vehicle the
greater protection typically granted to homes.
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Because the trial court properly characterized a camping
trailer as a building within the meaning of the burglary statute
and because the Shondel doctrine does not apply here, the trial
court committed no error in sentencing defendant for a felony
conviction for burglary.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's
conviction on one count of burglary, a third degree felony.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this //^day of July, 2007.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General
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Assistant Attorney General

10

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the
foregoing brief of appellee were mailed first-class, postage
prepaid, to A.W. Lauritzen, 15 East 600 North, #1, P.O. Box 171,
Logan, Utah 84321, this //i

day of July, 2007.

(

^Wu^ C.MtffaJt^

ii

